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NONDEDUCTIBLE CAPITAL LOSSES AND BONA FIDE
SALES UNDER THE FEDERAL INCOME TAX
TAXATION of capital gains and losses under the federal income tax has
produced both ardent controversy and endless litigation.' Opponents of such
taxation contend that it retards the mobility of capital. They challenge its
utility as a source of revenue.2 Adherents, on the other hand, reply that
capital gains constitute an obvious enrichment, and that a failure to consider
them would ignore a logical source of public revenue and would discriminate
arbitrarily against other taxpayers.
There is a basic disagreement, among those who advocate the taxation of
capital gains, over the means to be employed.3 'Methods suggested are usually
compromises between inclusion in taxable income of all anually accrued,
though unrealized, gain or loss and, on the other extreme, the recognition of
gains only when realized by sale or exchange. The former represents the
accrual method. It involves a critical question of constitutionality and ex-
tremely difficult problems of valuation.4 The latter represents the realization
method. It ignores price index changes and, as incorporated into the revenue
law, permits the individual to avoid income taxes by the simple expedient
of retaining until death those securities showing large capital gains.5 By
attaching an artificial importance to the fact of sale as the determinant of
capital gain or loss, it places a powerful weapon in the hands of the taxpayer to
use and misuse in minimizing taxes; for the power to sell rests wholly within
the taxpayer's control. This weapon, and the ability through it to create
1. See generally, SmoNs, PErso= s I-comr- TA xxno, (1938) 143-163; Rcro.x
OF SUBCOMMITTEE ON WrAYS AND MEAMNS ON PROrOSED REvisioN OF TUC RMnvzn7Uz LAws,
75th Cong., 3d Sess. (1938) 28-32; Kent, Taxation of Capital Gains and Losses (1938)
16 TAX fMAG. 389. For a critical exposition of foreign systems, see Haig, Taxation of
Capital Gains. Wall St. journal, March 23-April 13, 1937.
2. "The statistics of revenue controvert the allegation commonly made that there
would be no net revenue loss over the full period of an economic cycle if capital gains
should be relieved of all income taxation." REPORT, op. cit. supra note 1, at 30. But Lee
Snio-s. op. cit. mipra note 1, at 157.
3. See REPORT, op. cit. sipra note 1, at 32: SLvoxs, op. cit. stpra note 1, at 154;
TwEN-T=TH CENTURY FUND, INc., F. CNG THE TAX Pro 1xcu (1937) 431.
4. As to the constitutionalit, of taxing unrealized income, see RrEo-m, op. cat. s ura
note 1, at 32; cf. Eisner v. 1facomber, 252 U. S. 1S9, 207 (1920). As to taxing income
on the accrual basis, see M1AGIL, TAXABLE INc mE (1936) 165 et scq.; Slmoxs, op. cit.
supra note 1, at 167-169 (suggesting a decennial inventory).
5. Simo-xs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 212 suggests taxing capital gains at death as
if the securities were then sold. Compare INT. REv. CODZ § 44(d) (1939) (uing fair
market value at time of distribution, other than sale, of installment obligations). Because
the tax is progressive the prudent taxpayer would, through frequent wash sAes, l:hcep
his basis as little below current market value as possible. Increased manipulation would
put new emphasis on the capital loss problem.
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capital losses to offset taxable income, has presented the Government with
a considerable problem.
The intensity of this problem varies with the usefulness to the taxpayer of a
realized capital loss. Income and security price movements of course influence
the utility of realized capital loss to the taxpayer; and limitations on the
amount of loss deductible equally affect their availability. Under the 1934
Revenue Act, deductible losses were limited to capital gains plus $2,000,0
but individuals by the 1938 Act 7 and corporations by the 1939 Act 8 are
permitted full deduction0 of long term capital losses from all types of income.
Further, on assets held more than five years, the percentage of loss that will
be taken into account has been increased.' 0 To the extent that the taxpayer
is permitted to select and identify the particular security sold, avoiding the
"first in, first out" rule, the creation of capital loss is facilitated, and in this
matter the courts have shown increasing liberality." These factors will tend
steadily to enhance the value to the taxpayer of a realized capital loss.
Though permitting the taxpayer a free hand in timing the sale to his best
tax advantage, Congress obviously intended that capital losses should be
realized only by bona fide sales.' 2  In a number of transactions, however,
individuals have sought legal recognition of deductible losses while retaining
or regaining benefits which are normally lost in sale. Dominion over the
asset may be retained where the vendor exercises control over the vendee,
6. 48 STAT. 714, 26 U.S.C. §101(d) (1934). 47 STAT. 207 (1932), 26 U.S.C.
§ 117(a) (2) (1934) had limited losses to gains to prevent depression market losses from
wiping out normal taxable income, but was repealed in NIRA § 218(a), 48 STAT. 209
(1933). Until the 1934 Act there was no corresponding limitation, But see § 23(r),
47 STAT. 179 (1932).
7. 52 STAT. 500 (1938), INT. RaV. CODE § 117(d) (2) (1939). See generally Austin,
Capital Gains and Losses Under the Revenne Act of 1938 (1939) 17 TAxES 131.
8. INT. REv. CODE § 117(d) (1939) as amended by Pub. L. No. 155, 76th Cong.,
1st Sess. (June 29, 1939) § 212(a), but does not apply until tax year of 1940. Id. § 229.
9. But see INT. REv. CODE § 117(c) (1939). Short term capital losses (asset held
less than 18 months) are allowed only to the extent of short term capital gains. § 117(d)
as amended, supra note 8 (includes corporations). But see carry-over provision, § 117(e)
as amended. Cf. §23(r), 47 STAT. 179 (1932).
10. Compare 52 STAT. 500 (1938), INT. RWv. CODE § 117(b) (1939) with 48 STAT.
714, 26 U.S.C. § 101(a) (1934). Amount of individual's capital gain or loss now
recognized where asset is held up to 18 months, 100%; 18 to 24 months, 662/3%; over
24 months, 50%.
11. Identification by designation is now permitted as opposed to strict identity by
certificate. Helvering v. Rankin, 295 U. S. 123 (1935). But intention to sell particular
shares is not sufficient. Davidson v. Comin'r, 305 U. S. 44 (1938). See 2 PAuL &
MERTENS, LAW OF FEDERAL INcomE TAXATION (Supp. 1938) 180-190.
12. INT. REV. CODE § 23(g) (1) (1939) merely says "sale or exchange." The courts
supplied "bona fide," see Note (1936) 102 A. L. R. 505; and it is first mentioned in the
current U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, Art. 23(e)-i. For case collections on matters here
discussed, see 3 Prentice-Hall 1939 Fed. Tax Serv. 111 3,701-13,754; 391 C. C. H. 1939
Fed. Tax Serv. 111 95.41-195.5691; 392 id. 1" 887-888.
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either directly or through community of interest. The vendor may establish
this element of control by the familiar tax avoiding device of creating another
entity, corporate or trust, with which to deal.23 It may arise in the identity
of interest of a family - individuals legally, but economically a group., To
a lesser degree, it may be present in the ties of social or business friendship.'
Or the vendor may assure his ability to recover the asset through a contract
or option to repurchase, an indication that he intended only a temporary
change in the form of his asset.10 Patently, such transactions, although sales
in form, are not final dispositions by parties "dealing at arm's length."17
But with the evidence largely in the taxpayer's hands, the Treasury found
the task of proving bad faith not only onerous but too frequently impossible.18
To meet this situation, Congress inaugurated legislation based on the
premise that in certain types of transactions the likelihood of bad faith is
sufficiently great to warrant their universal disregard as establishing tax
deductions. Section 118,19 enacted to stem the tide of year-end wash sales,20
denied deductible loss to any sale followed or preceded within 30 days by a
repurchase of, or a contract or option to repurchase, substantially identical
securities. Impelled by a depression-born wave of tax evasion, the Congress
in 1934 denied deductible loss on sales between members of a family.2 ' For
despite a set of objective criteria of good faith developed by the courts,"-
13. Personal holding companies and family trusts also avoid taxes by vthholding
earnings or dividing income. Hearings before Joint Con:ttee on Ta. Evosion and
Avoidance, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 4, 18, 217, 264-225 (taxpayer created sixty-four
trusts for benefit of wife and three children). See Jacobson and Johnson, 4'1inimincing
Income and Estate Taxes: Family Trust, Corporation and Partnership (1936) 5 Brox -
L-N L. RE:v. 389.
14. "The solidarity of the family is to make it possible for the taxpayer to 'urrender
title to another and keep dominion for himself, or if not technical dominion, at least the
substance of enjoyment." Cardozo, J,, in Burnet v. Wells, 289 U. S. 670, 677 (1933).
15. E.g., mutual sales and repurchases of securities aggregating thirty millions in
the 1929-1930 market, between duPont and Raskob, intimate associates. Pierre S. duPont,
37 B. T. A. 1198 (1938) (losses disallowed).
16. See I. T. 2257, V-1 Ctm. Bum- 241 (1926).
17. " . . . alleged sales of property for the purpose of establishing losses must
be real, .alid transactions, definitely placing the legal and equitable ownership of the
property alleged to have been sold out of the hands and out of the control of the
seller." M. I. Stewart & Co., 2 B. T. A. 737, 739 (1925).
18. H. R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 26.
19. Ixr. REv. CoDE § 118 (1939), first enacted, 43 STAT. 269, 283 (1924).
20. "Where such sales and purchases were part of one plan, they were ineffective
to produce deductible losses, but there remained the difficulty of proving that they. were
parts of one plan-more correctly of meeting proof by the taxpayer that they were
not" Shoenberg v. Comm'r, 77 F. (2d) 446, 450 (C.C.A. 8th, 1935), cert. denfcd,
296 U. S. 586 (1935).
21. 48 STAT. 691, 26 U.S.C. §24(a)(6) (1934).
22. Reviewed in John E. Zimmermann, 36 B.T. A. 279, 284-285 (1937). 1. T. 1597,
III-1 Cmr. BULL. 149 (1924), disallowing loss on a sale between spouses filing joint
returns, was revoked by I. T. 2824, XIII-2 Cur. Bu.T. 293 (1934). Taxdng spuses
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the "boudoir sale" between husband and wife had long been a frequent source
of trouble. Deductions were also disallowed on sales between an individual
and a corporation where the former owned more than fifty percent of the
stock, with those shares held by his family attributed to him for this pur-
pose.23 Because this encouraged the creation of multiple holding companies
designed to escape the limitation of the provision by rendering transactions
entirely intercorporate,24 Section 24(b) was further amended 26 in 1937 to
abolish losses on sales between two corporations more than 50 percent owned
by or for an individual, where at least one of them was by statutory defini-
tion a personal holding company during the preceding tax year. Its appli-
cation was expanded by ascribing proportionately to stockholder, partner
or beneficiary the stock owned respectively by a corporation, partnership,
estate or trust, and to a stockholder the stock his partner held in the corpora-
tion. In addition, deductions were prohibited on sales between grantor and
fiduciary or fiduciary and beneficiary of a trust, and between fiduciaries of
trusts having a common grantor.
The weaknesses in this type of legislative approach are only too apparent.
When losses on a class of transaction are automatically disallowed because
there is inherent in the relation between the parties a high probability of bad
faith, a number of sales undertaken in good faith are condemned. 20 New
legislation2 7 will continue to embrace parties in progressively less closely
affiliated relations, and the proportion of bona fide sales will increase. Con-
sequently the law will interfere more and more with normal business relations.
A method which reaches too many innocent people in order to catch avoiders
is inappropriate. Further, as the law becomes more articulate, the bona fide
as a unit, suggested in Bruton, The Taxation of Family Income (1932) 41 YALE L. J.
1172, would eliminate these sales. But see Hoeper v. Tax-Commission, 284 U. S. 206
(1931) for possible unconstitutionality. The present rule seems to be that in a joint
return short term capital gains of one spouse cannot be offset by short term capital losses
of the other. For discussion of a related problem see Pierce v. Comm'r. 100 F. (2d) 397
(C. C. A. 2d, 1938). However, the rule is still being challenged. Walter C. Janney,
39 B. T. A., Jan. 31, 1939 (appealed to 3d Circuit).
23. 48 STAT. 691, 26 U.S.C. §24(a)(6) (1934).
24. See Hearings before Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 257. For an example see id. at 216-217.
25. 50 STAT. 827 (1937) as amended in 52 STAT. 464 (1938), INT. REV. CODE § 24(b)
(1939).
26. Many family sales are made for other than the tax reason, and many more have
been held bona fide in spite of it. See cases in John E. Zimmermann, 36 B. T. A. 279,
284-286 (1937); A. R. Glancy, 31 B.T. A. 236 (1934). MoTGomERy, FEDmEAL INComt
TAx HANDBOOK (1935) 513 disapproves of § 24(b) for this reason.
27. "Should time reveal new stratagems are being devised to thwart the spirit and
intent of the corrective legislation which the Congress may enact at this time, it is the
purpose of your committee to frame such further legislation as may be necessary to
checkmate them . . ." H. R. REP. No. 1546, 75th Cong., 1st Sess. (1937) 32.
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concept will be weakened in several ways. Despite Congressional denials?2
courts tend to rely on the explicit provisions as complete delimitation of
good faith in these transactions, and the more sharply the line between avoid-
ance and evasion is drawn, the closer the avoider may approach with im-
punity3 9 There are always courts who see in the subsequent passage of a
provision the tacit admission by Congress that the transaction disallowed was
formerly valid,30 thus jeopardizing several years of tax cases still in litiga-
tion. And, while burdening a field of the law which is already too complex,
these provisions offer no complete solution to the problem: they carve out
a part of the zone of conflict, but leave the borderline case - always the
hardest - untouched.
Scarcely more attractive is the opposite legislative approach, that of laws
couched in the most general terms, leaving to commissioner and judge the
task of spelling out their application. Typical of this kind of legislation is
the suggestion that Section 24(b) be repealed and that, without further
supplementary legislation, there be substituted a provision denying losses
"where the seller retains control, direct or indirect, over the property which
is the subject of the sale."' 31 Though it may be argued that this would provide
needed flexibility, as yet the Treasury has shown no marked success in ad-
ministering this type of law.32 And not even the extensive rulings and case
law necessary for practical administration could determine for certain the
individual case.33 In tax law there is an inevitable conflict between certainty
28. " . . . it is not intended by this amendment [§ 24(b)] to imply any legislative
sanction of claiming deductions for losses on sales or exchanges not covered thereby
where the transaction lacks the elements of good faith or finality, generally character-
izing sales and exchanges of property." Id. at 26.
29. "But the courts are chary about giving avoiders too much chance to shape the
facts of their transactions preliminarily in the light of definitely formulated rules. It
may be more important that the law be indefinite than that it be just to those who
are not avoiders . . ." PAUL, SrTms ix Fnmr.uL T.,x.Tio. (First Series, 1937) 155.
30. See 'Madeira v. Comm'r, 98 F. (2d) 556, 557 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938); Kaspare
Cohn Co., Ltd., 35 B. T. A. 646,672 (1937). "The fact that by the Revenue Act of
1937 the law was changed so that it now prohibits the recognition of a loss re-Ailting
from a transaction between the grantor and the fiduciary of a trust merely serves as
an indication that the Treasury Department has finally admitted that such a tran-action
should, under the law then in effect, have been recognized as a valid one . . . " (1933)
13 TE.rP. L. Q. 133, 135.
31. Angell, Tax Evasion and Tax Avoidance (1938) 3S COL. L RM. ED, 95.
32. In referring to In.'. REV. CODE § 102 (1939), imposing a surtax on corporation
who accumulate surplus to avoid taxes, Under Secretary of the Treasury Magill said,
"On the whole, the experience with that section has not been very satisfactory, becaue
of the vague terminology." Hearings, mspra note 13, at 205.
33. Eichholz, Should the Federal Income Tax Be Simplified? (1939) 43 YALE L J.
1200, 1217, strongly criticizing Angell's suggestion. "Mforeover, the word 'control' has
many subjective implications which are impossible to determine accurately in a specific
case . . .No provisions of our revenue laws are more productive of irritation than those
which cause taxability to depend upon subjective tests." Ibid.
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and fairness to each individual; one cannot be obtained without sacrificing
the other.34 Furthermore, such a provision would return to litigation all those
situations covered by current legislation, and any solution entailing increased
resort to the courts is highly undesirable. The delay and expense of litigation
is already one of the most distressing aspects of the federal tax system. 0
Taking a realistic view of the statutes here involved, however, their vices
seem more apparent than real. Evidently they have caused no more than
normal taxpayer disaffection,3" for the vast majority of transactions touched
had no real purpose other than tax avoidance. In their favor, it can be said
that the provisions have served to quiet a hitherto extensively used form of
tax avoidance; and while experts may yet construct the sale to fall beyond
their prohibition, inconvenience is itself an effective deterrent. As for the
complexity of the statutes, there is solace in the thought that the average
small taxpayer never sees the Revenue Act, and the larger taxpayer will
require legal advice anyway for his more complicated transactions. 7 Retention
of the provisions in their present form appears the most reasonable solution,
entrusting to the courts those cases which violate the spirit of the law, though
not its letter.
In the case of the bona fide concept, however, the wealth of decisions has
served only to increase the ambiguity. Contour is lost in a case law that
borders on chaos. Too frequently the expression is used but to camouflage
the absence of any substantial grounds for decision: it has magic powers to
direct the light in which equivocal facts are to be viewed.30
Where the good faith of a loss-realizing sale is challenged, it is generally
quite evident that the tax reduction motive predominated. It is agreed, how-
ever, that this cannot itself be made the basis of nondeductibility. Few courts
fail to preface their opinions with the rule of Gregory v. Helvcring,0 that the
purpose to minimize or avoid taxes by a particular transaction will not prevent
34. See PAUL, SELEc'rzn STUDIES IN FEDERa. TAXATION (Second Series, 1938) 300;
Angell, supra note 31, at 93.
35. On the average a Board of Tax appeals decision is handed down six years, a
Circuit Court decision eight years, and a Supreme Court decision nine years, after the
date of the return. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal Income,
Estate, and Gift Taxes-A Criticismn and a Proposal (1938) 38 COL. L. REv. 1393. The
flood of tax cases has led to a demand for reforms in procedure and court structure.
Ibid.; see Jackson, Equity in the Administratim of Federal Taxes (1935) 13 TAX
MAG. 641, 686; but see Youngquist, Proposed Radical Changes in the Federal Tax
Machinery (1939) 25 A. B. A. J. 291.
36. Private Communications to the YALE LAW JOURNAL. Of course it takes little
imagination to conjure up the "hard" case. E.g., MoNTGOmERY, op. cit. suipra note 26,
at 514.
37. Eichholz, supra note 33, at 1220.
38. In John T. Smith, 40 B. T. A., Aug. 15, 1939, the exhaustive record of sales
kept by the taxpayer reinforced majority's finding that they were bona fide. Id. at 14. To
the dissent they indicated how carefully he had devised his scheme, id. at 26.
39. 293 U. S. 465, 469 (1935).
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the transaction from affecting, as it otherwise would, the incidence of that
tax. But they assert that discovery of such a purpose is a signal for scrutiny
to determine whether the transaction is in actual fact what it appears to be
in form.4" To a certain extent this question is governed by imponderables;
its answer must depend in part on the instinctive moral reaction of the judge
to the taxpayer's efforts.41 Certainly he may minimize his taxes,4 2 but he
must take care not to offend the court's sense of fairness; if he tries a little
too hard, if the picture is a little too complete, he will lose his case. Thus
judges may seize on the mere repetition of a certain transaction as indicating
bad faith,4 3 though, logically, if bona fide the first time, it should lose nothing
in repetition. But for the most part, the matter of good faith must turn
on whether the taxpayer adds substance to the form of his transaction by
his willingness to abide its normal consequences. Courts insist upon a final
disposition of the property, involving the loss of control as well as tite.l
The question then arises as to whether the sale is final. Eventual repurchase
does not necessarily deny it that finality, for except as it is disallowed by
Section 118, where repurchase occurs within thirty days, the finality of a
sale must be judged by the original transaction as then conceived; subsequent
events are relevant only as they may reveal original intention. The dis-
qualifying element is the existence at the thw of sale of a "plan" to repur-
chase,45 and "plan" implies at least some arrangement with, or control over,
40. E.g., Helvering v. Johnson, 104 F. (2d) 140, 143 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Chisholm
v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 14, 15 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; Note (1936) 101 A. L I. 204, 205.
But cf. Helvering v. Gen. Utilities & Operating Co., 74 F. (2d) 972, 976 (C. C. A. 4th,
1935).
41. "The mind rebels against the notion that Congress . . . was willing to foster
an opportunity for juggling so facile and so obvious. . . . To such an attempt the
reaction of an impartial mind is little short of instinctive that the deduction is un-
reasonable. . ." Cardozo, J., in Woolford Realty Co. v. Rose, 286 U. S. 319, 330 (1932).
42. Not only has he no duty not to, Helvering v. Gregory, 69 F. (2d) 89, 810
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934); but it guides taxation into safer channels, IA=, TAx Avom-
AcE (2d ed. 1932) 3. "Furthermore, it (tax avoidance) is the only effective way most
of us have of registering our opposition to extravagance in governmental ex,¢penditures'
MoNTGo.I-Y, op. cit. supra note 26, at ix.
43. ". . . the very repetition of the devices used deprives the particular and all
transactions of reality." Harron's dissent in John T. Smith, 40 B. T.A., Aug. 15, 1939,
at 25. It is probable that the bad impression created by precise duplication would be
circumvented by an inconsequential change in the circumstances surrounding the trans-
action.
44. PAUL, STUDIES ix FEDERAL TAXATION (First Series, 1937) 137; Chisholm v.
Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 14, 16 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) and cases there cited.
45. "Two very recent cases [Comm'r v. Dyer, 74 F. (2d) 685 (C. C..PL 2d, 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 586 (1935) and Marston Y. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 936 (C. C..A.
2d, 1935)], in the Second Circuit, taken together, reveal the rule as to sales and repur-
chases. In the Dyer Case, there were sales and repurchmses hoth parts of an original
entire plan, and the claimed deductions were denied. In the Marston Case there was
a sale with no intention or plan to repurchase, but there was a later repurchase, and
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the vendee to assure the ability to affect repurchase. For, even though
admitted, the mere determination to buy the shares back in the open market
is immaterial. Thus a sale is final if the shareholder risks his holdings in the
open market.46 The risk of financial loss from intervening market fluctua-
tions, however, is no badge of finality or good faith, for even where the parties
are. not so closely identified that the taxpayer gains as vendee that which
he loses as vendor,47 the tax he saves may be greater than the loss which
he risks.
48
Were it certain that there was on the part of the vendor no coincident
intention to repurchase, it would make no difference with regard to finality
that he sold to a vendee within his control and that he subsequently reacquired
the property.49 But the fact of repurchase under these circumstances creates
a strong suspicion that such intention was present, 0 and the courts are in
general properly skeptical of the taxpayer's disavowals; his actions speak
louder than his words.9 ' Cases in which sales were upheld despite subse-
quent repurchase are distinguished, 52 either by the long period of time pre-
ceding resale, 53 or by an affirmative and convincing showing of lack of agree-
the claimed deduction on account of the sale was allowed." Shoenberg v. Comm'r, 77 F.
(2d) 446, 449 (C. C.A. 8th, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 586 (1935). Accord: Foster
v. Comm'r, 96 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
46. Samuel M. Vauclain, 16 B. T. A. 1005 (1929) (even though stock repurchased
same day, prior to § 118). Where husband sells securities on the market and wife im-
mediately buys similar securities with her own money, is there a wash sale under § 118?
An "indirect" sale between husband and wife under § 24(b)? Probably neither. See
Comm'r v. Behan, 90 F. (2d) 609 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937); MONTGOMERY, op. Cit. Supra
note 26, at 514. But if policy discourages immediate repurchase by the taxpayer, should
he be permitted to achieve nearly the same benefits through immediate repurchase by
one in close relation to him? § 118 might well be combined with § 24(b) and expanded
to disallow loss where, within 30 days, there has been a purchase by persons in the
relations there described.
47. Comm'r v. W. F. Trimble & Sons Co., 98 F. (2d) 853, 856, 858 (C. C. A. 3d,
1938).
48. Pierre S. duPont, 37 B. T. A. 1198 (1938).
49. Marston v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (disclaimer of intention
to repurchase reinforced by immediate resale) ; see Foster v. Comm'r, 96 F. (2d) 130,
133 (C. C. A. 2d, 1938).
50. "This design was too complete to be without designer." Pierre S. duPont, 37
B. T.A. 1198, 1266 (1938). But see Dwight C. Wheeler, 32 B.T.A. 909, 916 (1935).
51. Comm'r v. Dyer, 74 F. (2d) 685 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. demied, 296 U, S.
586 (1935) ; Rand v. Helvering, 77 F. (2d) 450 (C. C. A. 8th, 1935) ; Powell v. Comm'r,
94 F. (2d) 483 (C. C. A. 1st, 1938). But courts sometimes naively accept the taxpayer's
testimony. E.g., Comm'r v. W. F. Trimble & Sons Co., 98 F. (2d) 853 (C. C. A. 3d,
1938) (companies under common control, repurchase after 37 days).
52. Pierre S. duPont, 37 B. T. A. 1198, 1257 (1938).
53. E.g., John E. Lonergan, 4 B. T. A. 1209 (1926) ; Gray-Barkley Co., 11 B. T. A.
499 (1928) (each more than three years) ; General Securities Co., 38 B. T. A., Aug. 16,
1938 (two years).
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ment between the parties.54 The rule might then be stated: to be wanting in
finality, a transaction must involve both a sale to a sympathetic vendee and
a coexistent intention to reacquire the property.
The requirement that the taxpayer divest himself not only of title but of
control5 is not so easily formulated. Section 24(b) disallows losses where
certain relations exist between the parties, relations in which the element of
control has been most subject to abuse.; But excepting this provision. the
mere fact that the vendor is in position to exert control over the vendee does
not per se brand their transaction with had faith; it is still possible for such
parties to deal "at arm's length." 7 The ability to control a purchaser may
be used in three ways. First, it may be employed in the prelin:inaries to a
sale, as a method of bringing buyer and seller together. Thus it is p -ssible
to eliminate the needless service and expense of broker and exchange,'!" and
to avoid a sacrifice sale where the market is not a ready one.-' If the sale that
follows is otherwise bona fide, this use of control is hardly improper. Second,
this control may be used to vary the terms of the sale from a competitive
norm - typically a collusive reduction of price below real value to increase
the deductible loss. 0 Mlarket value will sometimes furnish a simple, objective
index to this misuse of the control relation.
Third, the ability to control may be employed by the seller to exercise
dominion over the asset after the sale is complete, where by the nature of
the asset, such dominion is of consequence to him. This use is manifestly
54. No contact between parties: Comm'r v. Neaves, 81 F. (2d) 947 (C. C. A. 9th,
1936); Charles E. Mitchell, 32 B.T.A. 1093 (1935). Change of condition: Cole v.
Helburn, 4 F. Supp. 230 (W. D. Ky. 1933) ; Comm r v. Hales, 76 F. (2d) 916 (C. C. A.
7th, 1935).
55. "But tax-ation is not so much concerned with the refinements of title as it is
with actual command over the property taxed . . . " Holmes, J., in Corliss v. Bowers,
281 U. S. 376, 378 (1930); Nicholson v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 978 (C. C. A. Sth, 1937);
Chisholm v. Comm'r, 79 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935), cert. denicd, 295 U. S. 641
(1935).
56. See notes 13, 14, 15, supra.
57. E.g., Moses XV. Faitoute, 3S B. T. A., July 12, 1938; John T. Smith, 39 B. T. A.,
Aug. 15, 1939; Note (1936) 102 A. L. R. 505. ". . . the act of tw.o parting dealing
at arm's length-which is the usual criterion, or at least an indispensable criterion of
examination of the reality or bona fides of a transaction such as this:' Pierre S. duPont,
37 B.T.A. 1193, 1238 (1938).
53. Comnm'r v. VWr F. Trimble & Sons Co., 98 F. (2d) 853, 856 (C. C. A. 3d, 1933).
59. Marston v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) ; General Securities Co.,
38 B. T. A., Aug. 16, 1938.
60. Fruit Belt Tel. Co., 22 B. T. A. 440 (1931). Sale for nominal sum: Comm'r
v. Ehrhart, 82 F. (2d) 338 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Grace A. Cowan, Ex-r., 30 B. T. A.
296 (1934), aff'd 88 F. (2d) 1007 (C. C. A. 6th, 1937) (memo); cf. Reginald Fincl-e,
39 B. T. A., March 3, 1939.
Large blocks of securities raise special problems of -aluation. See General Securities
Co., 38 B. T. A., Aug. 16, 1938; Peters, The Fair .lfarhet Value of Blod:s of S.3ch
(1939) 17 TAXES 17.
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inconsistent with arm's length dealing, although in application the terms
"dominion" and "consequence" obviously defy precise definition. Exercise
of dominion may be active, as in forcing the vendee to vote the stock or handle
the property in accord with the vendor's wishes ;61 or it may be passive, as
a mere restraint on further alienation. 2 If dominion were of such consequence
to the vendor that he would not have sold to other than a controlled vendee,
then the loss should be disallowed. 63  The importance of dominion to the
vendor may be determined by the nature of the asset: controlling, as opposed
to minority interests ;64 voting stock as distinguished from bonds and non-
voting shares; or physical assets vital to the conduct of the vendor's affairs.00
Tax evasion by means of a block of securities controlling an important oper-
ating subsidiary, shuttled between related companies,( thus would not be
permitted, for its sale to third parties would hardly have been contemplated.
Nor would considerations of this nature greatly increase administrative prob-
lems, for transactions involving large blocks of securities or holdings in un-
listed, family corporations are already subject to scrutiny by revenue officers.
That no court has given complete expression to this concept is due in part
to the doctrine of corporate entity, from which source have stemmed the
most serious structural faults of capital gains taxation.67 For where corporate
transactions are involved, to recognize control is to violate the rule that a
corporation will be regarded as an entity entirely distinct from those who
61. See George N. Grouse, 26 B.T.A. 477, 479 (1932). Vendor may even retain
possession. Esperson v. Comm'r, 49 F. (2d) 259 (C.C.A. 5th, 1931), cert. denied, 284
U. S. 658 (1931); Nicholson v. Comm'r, 90 F. (2d) 978 (C. C.A. 8th, 1937) (after
"selling" securities to son-in-law, vendor pledged them with his broker).
62. As in the case of family corporations. See Madeira v. Comm'r, 98 F. (2d)
556 (C.C.A. 3d, 1938).
63. Wickwire v. United States, 27 F. Supp. 724 (E. D. Mich. 1939). But cf. Helvering
v. Johnson, 104 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939). Offers made to third persons would be
relevant. St. Louis Union Trust Co. v. United States, 82 F. (2d) 61 (C. C. A. 8th,
1936) ; Marston v. Comm'r, 75 F. (2d) 936 (C. C. A. 2d, 1935) (sale at auction).
64. See Comm'r v. W. F. Trimble & Sons Co., 98 F. (2d) 853, 856 (C. C. A. 3d,
1938).
65. E.g., Glenwood Hotel Co., 5 B. T. A. 985 (1926).
66. Hearings before Joint Committee on Tax Evasion and Avoidance, 75th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1937) 216. The use of commonly controlled corporations to avoid taxes sug-
gests application of INT. Rzv. CODE § 45 (1939). See Asiatic Petroleum Co. v. Comm'r,
79 F. (2d) 234 (C. C.A. 2d, 1935), cert. denied, 296 U. S. 645, 664 (1935) (§45 preventg
avoidance as well as evasion) ; 4 PAUL & MERrENS, LAw OF FEDERAL INCOME TAXATION
(1934) § 38.98; U. S. Treas. Reg. 101, art. 45-1. It would seem to allow denial of
losses thus established but in General Industries Corp., 35 B. T. A. 615 (1937), by an
unnecessarily narrow construction it was ruled otherwise. Reversal would permit the
Treasury to avoid difficult problems in disregarding corporate entity (discussed post).
67. Srmoxs, op. cit. supra note 1, at 185 et seq. See REPoRT, op. cit. supra note 1,
at 2-3. For discussion of a suggestion to tax corporations as partnerships, SImoNs,
supra, 189-195. Generally, see 5 PAUL & MERTENS, op. Cit. supra note 66, §§ 53.18-53.23;
Finkelstein, The Corporate Entity and the Income Tax (1935) 44 YALE, L. J. 436.
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own and control it. Any logical consistency in applying the canon, Substance,
not form, will control, is thus impossible, for the corporation is entirely a
creature of form. The problem appears in so many variations that no com-
prehensive criterion has been developed; opinions are merely prefaced with
the observation that the corporate entity will be disregarded "only where
warranted by exceptional circumstance." 's Beyond this there is little accord
among the decisions as to what characterizes these circumstances in the case
of a sale to establish a capital loss.
Complete ownership by a single individual is, alone, not enoughCO Sone
courts have turned a decision on the general nature and purpose of the cor-
poration involved: if created to serve a business purpose, the corporate entity
will be observed; if used only for tax avoidance, it will be disregarded20 But
while corporate purpose is determinative in reorganization casesil it offers
little clue to the part played by the corporation in a particular transaction.
If the taxpayer is in control, he may rig his sale as well with an active com-
pany as with a dummy; and the same corporate entity has been disregarded
in some transactions, not in others." Some opinions emphasize the necessity
of observing all the formalities of sale, and would deny the entity where
transactions are conducted entirely by book entry, and without formal stock
transfers.3 But if the substance canon has any meaning, the decision should
not turn on matters that are largely form.
68. Burnet v. Clark, 287 U. S. 410, 415 (1932) ; Burnet v. Commonwealth Improve-
ment Co., 287 U. S. 415, 419 (1932); Note (1936) 102 A. I- IL 505. "In these cases
the rule, if it can be called a rule, is frequently announced that the entity .ill be dis-
regarded when it is necessary to promote justice or to obviate inequitable resIts."
Fuller, The Incorporated Individual: A Study of the One-Man Conzpany (1938) 51 HArv.
L. RFv. 1373, 1402.
69. Comm'r v. Eldridge, 79 F. (2d) 629 (C. C. A. 9th, 1935). See Smith v. Higgns,
102 F. (2d) 456 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939) ; (1938) 52 HARv. L. Rv. 325. Because ITr. Rnv.
CODE § 24(b) does not by its terms cover all transactions in which working control of a
corporation is a factor, the general lines dranm in prior case law are still controlling.
70. Helvering v. Johnson, 104 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; (1939) 52 Hriv.
L. REv. 1179. "The avoidance or suspension of taxes is not a business.' Electrical
Securities Corp. v. Comm'r, 92 F. (2d) 593, 595 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937). Finkelstein, supra
note 67, divides corporations into "normal and convenient" and "unusual and unnec-
cessary."
71. Gregory v. Helvering, 293 U. S. 465 (1935); Sandberg, The Income Tax Su-
sidy to "Reorganications" (1938) 38 CoL L. REv. 98; Fahey. Income Tax Definition of
"Reorganization" (1939) 39 CoL L. Rnv. 933, 937-946. While it might be claimed that
the concept here developed would, in certain transactions (e.g., Marjory T. Hardvicl:,
33 B. T. A. 249 (1935), (1936) 30 Ia- L. REv. 946] expand the type of loss diallwance
so closely restricted in § 112 (b) (5), it should be observed that in a slightly less degree
this is also true of § 24(b) (1) (B).
72. Foster v. Comm'r, 96 F. (2d) 130 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939).
73. Dissent in John T. Smith, 40 B. T. A., Aug. 15, 1939; cf. Comm'r v. McCreery,
83 F. (2d) 817 (C. C. A. 9th, 1936). But cf. Corrado & Galiardi, Inc., 22 B. T. A. 847
(1931).
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Still other courts would observe the corporate entity where the stockholder
has not used his power of control to the injury of the corporation. 74 If the
price is right, however, retention of dominion by the vendor need entail no
financial disadvantage to company or minority stockholder. The analysis of
the uses of control outlined above suggests one solution to the corporate
dilemma. The doctrine of corporate entity permits a person to create a
separate entity and to deal with it at arm's length without having its acts
attributed to him.75 Where, through an improper use of control his trans-
actions are inconsistent with arm's length dealing, he disables himself by his
own act from invoking the protection of the c6rporate entity, and the doctrine
offers him no assistance."
Determination of the good faith underlying a capital loss, whether individual
or corporate, should thus entail two inquiries: first, does there exist by dint
of stock ownership or other relation, the ability in one party to control the
other; second, in the immediate transaction, was this control element im-
properly used to vary the terms of sale from a competitive norm or to retain
dominion over the asset? 77 One cannot minimize the difficulty of factual
contradiction which must often hinder an attempt to answer these two ques-
tions. But if all courts would pose the issue in these terms, the facts in time
might marshall themselves into a fairly crystallized case law. It would seem
wiser to look for progress in this direction, rather than once more to revise
the statutes and subject taxpayers again to a host of first impression litigation.
74. Helvering v. Johnson, 104 F. (2d) 140 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); John T. Smith,
40 B. T. A., Aug. 15, 1939, at 14.
75. "A leading purpose of such statutes [incorporation laws] and of those who act
under them is to interpose a nonconductor, through which in matters of contract it is
impossible to see the men behind." Donnell v. Herring-Hall-Marvin Safe Co., 208 U. S.
267, 273 (1908).
76. " . . . Where stock ownership has been resorted to, not for the purpose of
participating in the affairs of a corporation in the normal and usual manner, but for the
purpose of controlling the corporation and dominating its management and affairs so
that it may be used as a mere agency, tool, or instrumentality of the owning corporation
or corporations, the courts will disregard the fiction of the separate corporate entity and
deal with the substance of the transactions in such manner as the justice of the case
may require." Ford Motor Co. v. United States, 9 F. Supp. 590, 600 (Ct. Cl. 1935),
cert. denied, 296 U. S. 636 (1935).
77. INT. Rzv. CoDE § 24(b) and § 118 merely deny losses, and it has been generally
assumed that a capital gain may be established by a sale to the taxpayer's wife, or by
a wash sale. E.g., MONTGOMERY, op. cit. supra note 26, at 520. But assume that a tax-
payer realizes a capital gain in a wash sale for the purpose of using up an available net
short term capital loss (deductible only from short term gains). In a subsequent sale
of the asset may he take advantage of the new, higher basis to limit his taxable gain?
It would seem that according to the bona fide concept he cannot, for the basis was not
established by a final disposition made in good faith; and neither estoppel nor the statute
of limitations will help him. But in practice, the Treasury apparently has not yet
attempted to apply this reasoning.
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